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Lessons	from	EMU:	Understanding	the	trade-offs
between	procedural	and	substantive	accountability
The	EU	is	frequently	criticised	for	lacking	democratic	accountability.	Mark	Dawson	and	Adina	Maricut-Akbik	draw
a	distinction	between	‘procedural	accountability’,	which	focuses	on	whether	actors	follow	the	correct	procedural
steps	in	reaching	a	decision,	and	‘substantive	accountability’,	which	assesses	the	value	of	a	policy	decision	itself.
They	argue	there	should	be	greater	attention	paid	to	the	potential	trade-offs	associated	with	each	approach,
particularly	in	light	of	the	notably	procedural	form	of	accountability	that	has	been	adopted	in	the	EU’s	Economic	and
Monetary	Union.
Academic	and	political	debates	about	accountability	in	the	European	Union	tend	to	be	frustrating.	In	many	ways,	we
know	what	is	wrong	with	democratic	accountability	in	the	EU	and	how	to	fix	it.	We	are	aware	of	the	weak	link
between	citizen	preferences	and	the	decisions	of	EU	institutions	and	generally	agree	that	the	EU	policy-making
process	requires	more	democratic	control	–	either	by	increasing	the	role	of	parliaments	in	oversight	or	by
empowering	courts	to	prevent	abuses	of	power.	This	search	to	‘renew’	EU	accountability	has	been	given	fresh
impetus	by	ambitious	reforms	in	the	fiscal	field	such	as	the	supposedly	‘Hamiltonian’	moment	of	the	new	European
‘Recovery	and	Resilience	Facility’	(RRF).
Yet	the	complexity	of	the	EU	political	system	does	not	allow	easy	fixes.	As	a	result,	scholars	and	policy	practitioners
often	discuss	institutional	reforms	at	the	margins	–	for	instance,	the	proposal	to	establish	a	subcommittee	for
Eurozone	oversight	in	the	European	Parliament.	The	problem	is	not	the	lack	of	ideas	about	how	to	reform	EU
accountability,	but	that	reform	proposals	cannot	be	easily	implemented	in	the	current	institutional	architecture.	EU
accountability	seems	to	demand	‘dramatic’	rather	than	incremental	change,	yet	the	more	dramatic	the	change,	the
less	likely	it	is	to	come	to	pass.
Paschal	Donohoe,	Minister	of	Finance	for	Ireland	and	President	of	the	Eurogroup,	giving	a	press	conference	on	5	October	2020,	Credit:	Barry	Cronin/European
Council
Against	this	backdrop,	we	use	a	recent	study	to	propose	a	new	approach	for	evaluating	accountability	in	the	EU.
We	argue	that	we	need	to	adapt	our	understanding	of	accountability	in	order	to	match	the	political	system	of	the
EU,	a	large-scale	political	unit	in	which	citizens	have	few	opportunities	to	influence	governing	decisions.	Following
Michael	Goodhart,	we	advocate	for	a	change	of	perspective,	shifting	the	focus	‘from	who	is	entitled	to	hold	power	to
account	to	the	reasons	why	accountability	is	justified	in	democratic	theory’	(see	p.	51).	Our	work	thus	raises	a	basic
question:	what	is	accountability	good	for?	To	take	the	example	above,	if	citizens,	parliamentarians	or	judges	seek
accountability	for	decisions	under	the	RRF,	what	exactly	are	they	seeking,	and	how	can	we	distinguish	between
different	varieties	of	such	an	accountability	claim?
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Drawing	on	liberal	and	republican	political	theory,	legal	scholarship,	and	the	public	administration	literature,	we
identify	four	normative	‘goods’	that	accountability	is	supposed	to	provide:
1.	Openness.	In	political	theory,	openness	is	related	to	the	idea	that	public	confidence	in	official	action	will
increase	if	public	policy	is	conducted	under	the	public	gaze	(what	Bentham	described	as	‘publicity’).	We	might
therefore	want	accountability	because	we	see	it	as	a	device	to	ensure	that	public	action	is	open,	transparent,
and	contestable.
2.	Non-arbitrariness.	There	are	two	dimensions	here:	on	the	one	hand,	the	classical	principal-agent	perspective
that	those	who	wield	public	power	should	do	so	in	a	limited	manner	and	that	they	should	exercise	coercion	only
to	the	degree	necessary	to	achieve	their	goals;	on	the	other	hand,	the	legal	perspective	that	public	action
should	be	limited	by	human	rights	or	due	process	guarantees.	Accountability	–	by	making	officials	answer	for
conduct	–	provides	a	means	by	which	arbitrary	distinctions	or	applications	of	power	can	be	identified,	and	later
remedied.
3.	Effectiveness.	While	openness	and	non-arbitrariness	seem	highly	normative	values,	accountability	may	be
sought	for	more	utilitarian	reasons,	namely	that	accountable	officials	are	more	likely	to	deliver	high-quality
results.	From	this	perspective,	accountability	holds	the	promise	of	performance.	The	premise	here	is	that	the
need	to	justify	and	even	correct	conduct	will	likely	improve	the	design	of	policy-making	or	implementation.
4.	Publicness.	This	encompasses	the	idea	that	official	action	should	be	oriented	towards	the	common	good	–
and	therefore	justified	by	public	or	universal	reasons.	This	involves	demonstrating	both	that	officials	were	not
personally	enriched	and	that	their	decisions	are	fairly	balanced,	taking	into	account	different	societal	interests
and	perspectives.
Having	established	the	normative	goods	of	accountability,	the	question	is	how	they	can	be	delivered	in	practice.	To
concretise	the	four	goods,	we	introduce	the	distinction	between	procedural	and	substantive	accountability,
borrowed	from	public	law.	Procedural	accountability	suggests	an	accountability	relation	oriented	around	the	process
by	which	a	particular	decision	was	rendered.	If	we	are	holding	an	actor	to	account	procedurally,	we	are	calling	them
to	account	for	the	procedural	steps	they	undertook	in	forming	or	executing	a	policy	decision.	By	contrast,	if	we	are
holding	an	actor	to	account	substantively,	we	are	calling	them	to	account	for	the	substantive	worth	of	the	policy
decision	itself.	The	distinction	is	applicable	to	different	types	of	accountability	forums:	parliaments	engaging	in
legislative	oversight,	courts	conducting	judicial	review,	or	ombudsmen	and	courts	of	auditors	performing
administrative	reviews.
We	apply	these	theoretical	insights	to	the	EU’s	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	(EMU).	As	pointed	out	before,	the
EMU	is	a	major	achievement	of	European	integration	but	also	one	of	its	major	democratic	accountability	challenges.
In	our	view,	the	specific	constitutionalisation	of	EMU	in	the	Maastricht	Treaty	led	to	a	predominance	of	procedural
accountability,	which	produced	several	pathologies.	Most	problematically,	there	are	dangers	of	a	‘replacement
effect’	of	procedures	for	substance	and	a	consistently	weak	position	of	accountability	forums	vis-à-vis	actors	with
expert	knowledge	such	as	the	European	Central	Bank.	Moreover,	the	difficulties	associated	with	applying
procedural	accountability	are	laid	bare	when	applied	to	ambitious	projects	such	as	the	RRF,	which	has	clear
distributive	implications.
Despite	these	limitations,	we	do	not	conclude	that	procedural	accountability	is	of	limited	value	universally.	Its
advantages	are	clarity	and	predictability,	which	make	it	an	important	avenue	in	providing	accountability	in	EMU.
However,	without	a	substantive	component,	EMU	accountability	is	likely	to	remain	focused	on	processes	of
decision-making,	which	are	insufficient	for	evaluating	decisions	in	a	policy	field	that	is	increasingly	distributive	in
nature.	Conversely,	substantive	accountability	carries	trade-offs	in	terms	of	its	complexity	and	costs.	The	limited
knowledge	of	forums	seeking	substantive	accountability	(such	as	judges	and	parliamentarians),	and	the	need	to
allow	economic	discretion,	remain	constraining	factors.	Moreover,	accountability	forums	need	expertise	in	many
fields	to	balance	information	asymmetries,	implying	high	costs.
For	these	reasons,	the	choice	for	procedural	or	substantive	accountability	should	in	our	view	be	political	and	revised
at	regular	intervals.	In	other	words,	EMU’s	political	architects	have	to	decide	again	if	the	costs	of	substantive
accountability	are	worth	the	payoffs,	or	alternatively,	if	they	are	willing	to	accept	the	trade-offs	that	procedural
accountability	entails.	The	EU’s	Hamiltonian	turn	may	provide	it	with	a	further	opportunity	to	re-evaluate	its
accountability	choices.
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For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Barry	Cronin/European	Council
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